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Chapter 3 
Discretion, contracting, and commodification: privatisation of US immigration detention as a 
technology of government  
Lauren Martin 
 
In Conlon, Deirdre and Hiemstra, Nancy (Eds.) Intimate Economies of Immigration Detention: 
Critical Perspectives. London: Routledge. Pp. 32-50. 2017. 
 
Introduction 
Until 2014, US immigration officials did not detain families indefinitely as a rule. The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) first contracted with Berks County in March, 2001, to hold up to 84 
parents and children traveling with insufficient documentation while their asylum claims were 
processed, but the vast majority of arriving noncitizen families were released on their own 
recognizance or with bond. Policy changes in 2004 and 2005 created new categories of detainable 
people, and the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) opened the T. Don Hutto 
Family Residential Facility in 2006 to hold families subject to mandatory detention under the new 
rules (see Martin, 2012). The Obama Administration released all families from Hutto in 2009 as part 
of a broader detention system reform, but was careful to retain its discretion to detain families. In the 
summer of 2014, ICE encountered an unprecedented rise in undocumented children and families: 
49,959 unaccompanied children and 52,326 family units were apprehended that year, mostly in the 
Rio Grande Valley of Texas (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2014, 2). In response to 
what became known as the ‘child migrant crisis,’ ICE opened a 532-bed facility for families in 
Artesia, New Mexico.  
 
The Artesia family detention centre was built at a border patrol training facility, 200 miles from the 
nearest city with immigration legal services. ICE implemented a no-release policy and an expedited 
immigration court procedure, with the goal of quickly deporting detained families. A volunteer lawyer 
network quickly formed to represent families (Manning n.d.), and multiple lawsuits followed, 
charging the immigration agency with violating the right to claim asylum, children’s access to 
residential facilities, intimidation, lack of access to legal services, blanket detain-and-deport decisions 
regardless of individual circumstances, and refusal to release documents about detained families 
(M.S.P.C v. Johnson 2014, American Immigration Council et al. v. DHS 2014). With legal pressure 
mounting against detention procedures at Artesia, ICE closed the facility in the fall of 2014 and 
transferred families to facilities in Karnes County and Dilley County, Texas. These two facilities are 
owned by the two largest private corrections firms in the US, GEO Group and the Corrections 
Corporation of America, respectively. While GEO’s facility was built as a ‘civil detention centre’ for 
low-risk detainees in 2012, the South Texas Family Detention Center has been constructed specifically 
for families. At 2,400 beds, the South Texas facility is the largest detention centre in the United States.  
All three of the family detention centres opened in 2014 were contracted quickly and without 
competitive bidding, a process that ICE defends as necessary to respond to large influxes. The role of 
ICE’s authority to contract with private sector partners relied upon, in this case, the expediency of 
crisis to justify a drastic expansion of detention as a spatial practice of immigration control (Mountz 
and Hiemstra, 2014). 
 
Because of family detention’s fast expansion, and growing evidence of private corrections 
corporations’ large lobbying expenditures, much of the popular and academic analysis has focused on 
collusion between private firms and migration policy-makers. While much blame is laid at private 
corporations’ feet, family detention’s story shows how nominally distinct economic logics of financial 
gain and political logics of deterrence and enforcement are entangled. This chapter argues that the 
private-public boundary itself is a technology of government, a distinction that enables certain 
practices, material arrangements, and logics.  I focus on three processes through which “state” and 
“private” actors codify formal relationships with each other: discretion, contracting, and 
commodification. Through the example of family detention, however, I show how messy and ad hoc 
these relationships can be and that processes of discretion, contracting, and commodification challenge 
the divisions between market and state, private and public, and political and economic actors.  To 
better account for this messiness, I approach the boundary between public and private as a technology 
of government that enables immigration officials to control migrant life in particular ways. By 
emphasising the practices that make detention privatisation possible, this conceptual approach is at 
once flexible enough to account for the messiness of migration control on the ground and precise 
enough to critique exclusionary arrangements of power.  
 
The following analysis is based on interviews with advocates and attorneys; visits to T. Don Hutto and 
Karnes City detention centres in 2010, 2011, and 2015; participant observation of the campaign to 
close Hutto from 2008 to 2010; and analysis of detainee testimonies and media, journalism, non-
governmental reports, legal cases and government documents pertaining to family detention between 
2009 and 2015. The chapter will first review contemporary approaches to the privatisation of 
immigration enforcement, then explain how understanding private-public boundaries as a technology 
of government opens up wider frames for these relationships. The third section works through some 
examples of discretion, contracting, and commodification to show how the public-private boundary is 
put to work to allow the expansion of family detention. The concluding discussion draws further 
inspiration from anthropological and sociological studies of the economy to elaborate a nuanced 
approach to political economies of enforcement.  
 
Unpacking privatisation 
Studies of immigration enforcement have focused a great deal on political rationalities, legal 
frameworks, and discursive productions of ‘illegal immigrant,’ ‘alien,’ ‘migrant,’ and ‘refugee.’ 
Recently, research has drilled down into banal and embodied practices of policing, detention, and 
deportation, which has revealed highly variable detention conditions, ad hoc policing and transfer 
practices, and lasting physical and emotional effects of deportation (Conlon and Gill, 2013; Hiemstra, 
2013; Mountz et al., 2013; Williams & Boyce, 2013; Coleman & Kocher, 2011; Conlon, 2011; 
Mountz, 2010; Coutin, 2010; Gill, 2009). Scholars have problematised policy discourses and elite 
framings of immigration through ethnographic approaches that emphasise the interconnectedness of 
human living and the intimacies of everyday life. While much of this work notes the prevalence of 
private prison and security companies in policing, processing, detention, and deportation practices, 
less work has problematised the process of marketisation of immigration enforcement at the same 
level of detail (a gap that this volume goes far to address). There are, however, some important efforts 
to provide an analytic frame for these political economic relationships across sociology, anthropology, 
geography, political science, and international relations. Two key terms, ‘industry’ and ‘assemblage,’ 
have dominated this emerging literature, deployed in distinct, but sympathetic, ways to conceptualise 
the complicated relationship between immigration control and non-state actors. Here I review this 
work, focusing on the implications industrial and assemblage conceptualisations have for analysing 
privatisation as a political process.  
 
Migration, enforcement, and illegality as industry 
Analyses of the political economy of immigration enforcement, especially the privatisation of 
detention in the United States, have revolved around various formulations of ‘the immigration 
industrial complex’ (Doty & Wheatley, 2013; Golash-Boza, 2009a, b; Fernandes, 2007; Welch, 2002). 
These studies have tracked campaign donations from the private corrections sector to politicians 
(Saldivar & Price, 2015); the ‘revolving door’ between immigration and corrections agencies and 
private prison companies (Golash-Boza, 2009a, b; Welch, 2002); media pundits’ exaggerated claims 
about immigration rates and terrorist threats (Golash-Boza, 2009a); the merging of counter-terrorism 
and immigration enforcement (Saldivar and Price, 2013) and the role of private corrections 
representatives in drafting immigration legislation (Doty and Wheatley, 2013). The broad claim 
behind arguments for an ‘immigration industrial complex’ is that private sector, media, and 
immigration agencies emphasise enforcement, albeit to different ends, and this produces a 
‘convergence of interests’ that supports the continued expansion of immigration detention in 
privatised facilities.  
 
Focusing on immigration detention, Doty and Wheatley (2013) elaborate four specific components of 
the immigration industrial complex: (1) the US’ immigration law apparatus; (2) prison corporations; 
(3) ideas and worldviews of neoliberal commercialisation, deterrence, and criminalisation; and (4) 
lobbying, donation, and policy-making networks. This four-part complex forms a ‘massive, 
multifaceted, and intricate economy of power, which is composed of a widespread, diverse, self-
perpetuating collection of organisations, laws, ideas, and actors’ (Doty and Wheatley, 2013, p. 438). 
This economy of power is neither purely economic nor purely political. It includes profit-oriented 
management knowledge, but also lobbying and campaign donations that seek to build the kind of 
personal connections that lead to contracts (Fernandes, 2007).  The immigration industrial complex is 
not, then, a closed entity, but a compilation of networks sustained by multiple discourses, embodied 
practices, material infrastructures, and legal regimes.  
 
Corporations are not, however, the only actors seeking to profit from the migration process, which has 
provoked some migration scholars to situate immigration control within a larger set of migration-
related economic networks. Hernandez-Leon (2013) argues that migration studies has largely 
neglected the role of profit-seeking in migration’s facilitation, regulation, control and 
institutionalisation, and proposes the concept of ‘the migration industry’ to capture the entrepreneurial 
motivations of many actors across migration trajectories. He is most concerned with how ‘financial 
gain’ motivates migrants, facilitators, and a range of service providers alongside mutual aid and 
familial obligation. For Hernandez-Leon, profit-seeking and mutual aid are not mutually exclusive; 
rather, we should recognise that not only do migrants move in and out of different roles in the 
migration process but that they have overlapping economic desires. This approach displaces profit-
seeking from enterprises like corporations or smuggling networks, showing that profit-seeking is one 
of many economic rationalities and can be performed by anyone. 
 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen (2013) expand Hernandez-Leon’s definition of the migration 
industry to include ‘control providers’ and non-profit ‘rescue industry’ organisations. For them, 
facilitation, control, and rescue form three (often overlapping) prongs of the migration industry with 
varying degrees of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ market integration. Their primary concern is to begin to 
tease out how economic rationalities are imbricated with migration decisions at every part of the 
facilitation and management process. In particular, they argue that state migration policies form an 
important part of the background context in which facilitators, rescuers, and migrants themselves 
operate. As states gather information about migration pathways and people smuggling networks, 
facilitators influence migration management policies carried out by states, and private operators profit 
from the performance of state migration control procedures. Migration brokers, both licit and illicit, 
make a premium from increased enforcement, and states respond to creative migration strategies with 
ever-more technological fixes.  
 
For Andersson (2014) it is precisely this migration-enforcement feedback loop that is productive and 
that makes ‘the illegality industry’ a useful frame. Through his multi-sited study of migration in Africa 
and the Mediterranean, Andersson argues that the illegality industry works not just through economic 
relationships between agencies, contractors, facilitators, and travelers, but through discursively 
producing ‘the migrant’ as a category and ‘illegality’ as a condition, and threat as a quality of both. 
The term refers to economic, geographical, and symbolic elements of migration management in order 
to allow analytical flexibility: ‘it foregrounds interactions among humans, technology, and the 
environment; it highlights how illegality is both fought and forged in material encounters; and it 
allows for the consideration of a dispersed “value chain,” or the distinct domains in which migrant 
illegality is processed, “packaged,” presented, and ultimately rendered profitable’ (Andersson, 2014, 
p. 15). Like Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørenson’s ‘migration industry,’ Andersson’s ‘illegality 
industry’ emphasises the interrelatedness of actors across apparent boundaries of public, private, legal, 
illegal, state, and non-state. Like US scholars studying the immigration industrial complex, Andersson 
seeks to show how discursive categories produce migration as a particular kind of problem and the 
large amounts of money circulating between actors seeking to manage migration in various ways. All 
of these conceptualisations of industry seek to show that economic, social, and symbolic relationships 
are bound up with each other.  
 
Across this work, there remains ambiguity about what, precisely, economic or profit-seeking practices 
are, where they begin and end, and to what extent profit-seeking behaviour or private firms’ 
motivations explain migration policy-making. Spener (2009) argues that most social scientists use the 
term ‘industry’ figuratively rather than analytically; it operates more as a metaphorical comparison 
than a full-fledged theoretical category. When, for example, are migrants treated like commodities and 
when are migrants actually priced, exchanged, and circulated? In many of the analyses cited above, 
framing human mobility as an industry has also implied a corporate structure of integration, valuing 
real estate, and creating markets that can narrow analysis of heterogeneous governmental practices to a 
single economic logic, namely a profit-oriented capitalist one. Spener argues that industrial figures of 
speech are, in fact, useful if we acknowledge them as such, and then turn our analysis to the specific 
types of activities, relationships, and circulations that produce human mobility. For studies of the 
intimate economies of detention, it is important to analyse not only the material processes of 
commoditisation, marketisation, embodied labour, and legal practices, but also to problematise the 
work that these terms do, as metaphors or as efforts to frame political relationships in new terms. Here 
I turn to another approach to the same problematic: the assemblage. 
 
Migration governance as assemblages 
Research in security studies and international relations has traced the imbrication of finance and 
security, but has conceptualised these new governmental arrangements not as an industrial complex 
but as an assemblage. The empirical content of this research is similar to the research reviewed above, 
in that it traces former officials’ private sector enterprises and major governmental contracts with 
multi-national data management and security analysis firms. Coming from international relations and 
political science, much of this work has focused on state security agencies and contractors, however.  
Analyses of security-economy assemblages have emphasised shared ways of knowing space and time 
over sectoral interests, preferring to focus on the proliferation of certain knowledge practices instead 
of personal relationships between public and private sector actors.   
 
For critical security studies and international relations scholars, the blurring of boundaries between 
state and economy has produced new legal and spatial formations of sovereignty. In her analysis of 
anti-terrorist financing policies, de Goede (2012) shows that speculative risk analysis practices from 
the financial sector were picked up by security professionals seeking to preempt the next terrorist 
attack. Preemptive security practices and financial speculation both require a particular disposition 
towards the future and its unpredictability, a conception of uncertainty, possibility, and emergence that 
allows for multiple forms of intervention with little evidence (Amoore, 2013). And because 
governments awarded counter-terrorism risk analysis contracts to some of the world’s largest financial 
and accounting firms, the connection is material and monetary.  Moreover, security professionals in 
North America and Europe use banal monetary transactions in the banking sector to track everyday 
mobilities and associations, so that economic activity itself becomes a medium of security knowledge 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2008).  
 
In addition, US dominance in the private security sector has become an economic development 
concern for EU policy-makers, so much so that some EU-level agencies seek to establish a ‘European 
civil security market’ (Hoijtink, 2014).  This market is supposed to bridge defense and individual 
security sectors and has focused on hard- and software interoperability, or making data shareable 
across platforms. The European civil security market came to be through a series of EU-level research 
funding schemes, which recruited expertise from private sector security firms for recommendations on 
how to build a civil security market (Bigo & Jeandesboz, 2010). These examples do not fit neatly into 
narratives of public sector privatisation because state, supra-national, non-governmental, and corporate 
organisations worked together in a wide variety of capacities, with different contractual obligations. In 
addition, shared understandings of uncertainty and emergence are harder to capture by focusing on the 
public or private ownership of security activities.  
 
For many of these scholars, European security governance is best conceptualised as an assemblage to 
grapple with the contingent agreements between different actors. Focused on the growing role of 
private security companies throughout the world, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) argue for a ‘global 
security assemblage,’ ‘a complex and multilayered arrangement in which global capital, transnational 
private security, state authorities, local police, and international police advisers are integrated in the 
planning and provision of security’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, p. 8).  This distribution of tasks 
traditionally left to sovereign state governments changes the substance and composition of sovereign 
power. De Goede argues for a ‘finance-security assemblage,’ ‘not so much a tightly drawn sovereign 
power but an apparatus in which diverse and sometimes contradictory elements come together to 
produce a logic of governing that works through an appeal to uncertain futures’ (2012, p. xxii). Also 
concerned with both public-private cross-pollination and the shared spatiotemporal calculations of 
possible futures, Amoore (2013) argues that contemporary security practices indicate an ‘alliance’ 
between economy and sovereignty, a sharing of knowledge practices, measurement techniques, and 
authority. In this ‘moving complex,’ economy and sovereignty ‘resonate’ and ‘infiltrate’ each other, 
rather than sorting neatly into separate spheres.   
 
There are two important points to draw from this work. The first point is that private sector 
participation in public service provision is rather unexceptional in the context of neoliberal state 
restructuring. Non-governmental organisations operate youth detention facilities, hospitals, charter 
schools, public school testing and audits, infrastructure construction, security in public buildings, and 
a host of food, physical plant, and personnel services. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) argue that the 
privatisation of security needs to be located in relation to broader transformations of governance that 
have reworked spatialities of public and private, global and local, state and non-state power.  For 
example, Doty and Wheatley (2013) understand the United States’ growing reliance on private prison 
firms as part of a broader trend towards the ‘privatisation of sovereignty functions,’ such as 
surveillance, immigration responsibilities, risk analysis, and policing. As Lahav (1998) has argued, 
enrolling third party actors like airlines and freight companies has allowed state agencies to extend 
control without expanding bureaucracy, producing ‘reinvented forms of state sovereignty and 
exclusion’ (Lahav, 1998, p. 678). Responsibility for migration control has been rescaled ‘up,’ ‘out,’ 
and ‘down’ in ways that do not curtail state power to manage population movement, but reduce 
political costs to European states while increasing their flexibility in controlling migration. Not the 
attenuation of state power once presumed by globalisation scholars, outsourced sovereignty functions 
like security and migration controls are indicative of changing governance arrangements and the 
blurring of key liberal legal dichotomies of public and private, state and market, national and 
international (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009).  In the case of migration control, outsourcing usually 
enables states to extend policing powers. 
 
The second point is an analytical one. The economy-security assemblage approach shifts focus from 
the boundary-crossing of public and private to the techniques, technologies, and calculations that 
produce regimes of truth about security, mobility, and economy. This thread of research focuses on 
what Miller and Rose (2008) describe as technologies of government: 
The actual mechanisms through which authorities of various sorts have sought to shape, 
normalize and instrumentalise the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others 
in order to achieve the objectives they consider to be desirable….of apparently humble 
and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: techniques of 
notation, the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as 
habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design 
and architectural forms—the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, unlimited (Miller 
and Rose, 2008, p. 32). 
 
In the context of immigration detention, technologies of government include head counts; facility 
audits; quality assurance measures; handbooks and protocols; entrance-way metal detectors; visitation 
regulations; dining hall menus and their development; ID checks for detained persons, staff and 
visitors; building designs and flow charts; per-bed economic analyses; real estate valuation of 
facilities; private correction firms’ stock price valuation and credit ratings; corrections as an academic 
discipline and profession; and the myriad legal frameworks governing imprisonment, labour, state 
facilities, contracting, and administrative practice. For Miller and Rose (2008), technologies of 
government make political rationalities capable of being realised, and so these technologies not only 
enumerate, define, hierarchise, and order noncitizens as both individuals and populations, but also 
establish and reproduce certain forms of authority, expertise, and knowledge. In other words, 
detention’s calculative practices create the conditions of possibility for particular forms of 
immigration detention, for the choice of contracted prisons over residential ones, for detention as a 
policy choice for vulnerable populations, and legal relief options available to detained noncitizens.  
 
Technologies of government normalise detention as a migration policy, and they do so, in part, by 
creating relationships. Like all economic transactions—capitalist and otherwise—exchange creates 
social bonds and networks of circulation (Appadurai, 1988). These relationships require work and 
continual maintenance, some of which occurs through repetition, rituals, and reciprocity of exchange. 
Supported by the material landscape of detention, the very real durability of a detention centre and 
contractual obligations that create a distinct timeline for particular relationships, outsourcing detention 
requires and sustains networks that attain their own momentum.  Contracts, for example, make 
relationships between government agencies and service providers durable into the future. This ability 
to create durable networks, alliances, and infrastructure allows certain relations of power to calcify, to 
become sedimented in time and space. As Povinelli (2011) has argued, the management of time and 
the ability to create durable relationships is a key axis of social regulation. And so to understand how 
people become detainable, and how detention continues to be a favoured policy option, we must attend 
to the contracts that establish enduring relationships between actors, and to the forms of authority and 
knowledge practices that authorise contracting. More to the point, the practice of contracting relies 
upon and reproduces a particular formulation of ‘public’ and ‘private,’ and managing the boundary 
between them is a critically important technology of government in the US immigration detention 
system.  
 
Here I return to family detention to show how ‘privatisation’ relies upon three specific technologies of 
government: discretion, contracting, and commodification. These technologies rely upon different 
legal norms, but are made to work together. What I will show is that immigration law’s specific 
formulation of discretion is not so exceptional, but makes use of administrative norms at work 
throughout the executive branch. ICE’s administrative discretion is crucially important to ICE’s ability 
to form Inter-Governmental Service Agreements (IGSAs) with county governments, who can then 
contract detention centre management to companies or other organisations. This administrative 
discretion is, however, a bit different from its prosecutorial and executive discretion. These contracts 
not only link these actors in relationships that endure for the length of the contract, but it also does 
political work of translating detention into a range of services that can be priced. Thus, contracts 
authorise monetary exchanges that sustain these relationships, and translate detention into a series of 
exchange values, abstraction that conceals the violence of detention and the political questions of 
sovereignty, right to mobility, and due process embedded in it (Mitchelson, 2014).  Focusing on what 
makes privatisation possible, I analyse how discretion, contracting, and commodification are distinct 
technologies of government that are made to work together. In the concluding discussion, I discuss 
how this approach opens up broader understandings of economic practice. 
 
Outsourcing family detention: discretion, contracting, and commodification 
Legally defined discretion over immigration enforcement is a critical legal technology of government 
for immigration agencies in the United States, and crucial to enabling the fast growth of outsourced 
immigration and border enforcement. US immigration officials practice discretion in three important 
ways. First, they have prosecutorial discretion, which allows immigration prosecutors a degree of 
autonomy in deciding who to prosecute. This allows them to focus resources on particular groups of 
noncitizens (such as violent criminals) or to provide relief to other groups (such as ‘deferred action’ 
for noncitizens who entered the US as children). Second, they have administrative discretion to grant 
parole to detainees based on flight risks assessments. Third, immigration officials have executive 
discretion to decide what tools and practices, such as biometric passports and workplace raids, are 
necessary to enforce immigration legislation. Many of these policies are subject to Congressional 
funding, and Congress can set certain demands or limitations, such as requiring ICE to have 34,000 
beds available to detain noncitizens. Administrative discretion has become a common legal tool 
throughout federal government policymaking to make government more efficient. Based on legal 
precedent (Chevron USA v NRDC 1984), courts defer to executive agencies because they are 
accountable to the voting public (via the presidential office) and this accountability forces those 
agencies to work in the best interests of affected populations (Neuman, 2006). With respect to 
immigration, conservative legislators argued that migrants’ multiple appeals of their deportation 
decisions led to inefficiency in achieving deportation goals (Neuman, 2006).  Protected by judicial 
deference to executive agencies, an ICE officers’ decision-making process about who to detain, why, 
where, and for how long is exempt from federal court review. Thus, discretion’s overlapping legal 
norms allowed ICE to expand its authority to detain, to define who is eligible for detention, and to 
choose what forms of detention are appropriate.  
 
ICE implemented the first permanent family detention policy in March 2001 at the Berks County 
Family Shelter Care centre near Reading, Pennsylvania, (Berks hereafter) a location close to major 
airports in the New York City area. The facility was built as Berks Heim (German for home), a 
nursing home for indigent elderly people in the county. When a new elderly care facility was built in 
the late 1990s, the county looked for ways to use the old building. Berks County contracted with then-
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to hold noncitizen detainees in the county jail. County 
officials charged far more for detainee beds than it paid for county prisoners, allowing it to support 
further county operations. A family detention facility, however, had to meet the standards of care for 
minors laid out in a 1997 lawsuit, Flores v. Meese. Because other INS detention facilities were 
modelled on prisons rather than residential centres, INS faced a contradiction between court-mandated 
conditions for children and the actually existing conditions of its own facilities. Berks filled this gap, 
allowing INS to detain some families without violating children’s entitlements. With these procedures 
in place, the county maintained around 84 persons in detention, primarily asylum-seeking families 
arriving without identity documentation.  
 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, heightened concerns over cross-border migration, and in 
2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was founded, absorbing and reorganising 27 
agencies including immigration, citizenship, and border enforcement (Martin and Simon, 2008).  In 
2004 and 2005, DHS expanded Expedited Removal, a provision in immigration legislation allowing 
summary deportation, from ports of entry to areas between ports of entry and maritime areas. In other 
words, DHS changed how it applied legislative categories, and in doing so, made a much larger set of 
noncitizens subject to mandatory detention, also required by immigration legislation. At the time, 
expanding detainability re-asserted the contradiction between immigration detention conditions and 
children’s protections: families who had not been subject to mandatory detention before now fell into 
that category. This move limited ICE officers’ discretion to release families with Notices to Appear in 
immigration court. To address this gap in detention capacity, and to deter more families from 
attempting entry, ICE entered into an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with Williamson 
County, Texas, to detain families at the T. Don Hutto Family Detention Centre (Hutto hereafter) in 
2006.  
 
The Corrections Corporation of America built the T. Don Hutto Correctional Facility in 1995, as a 
medium-security facility for federal male inmates. Williamson County sub-contracted with CCA to 
provide the family detention services stipulated in its IGSA with ICE. CCA made no changes to 
Hutto’s disciplinary procedures or physical appearance to accommodate its new population, and in 
2007 advocates sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under a previous class action 
settlement, Flores v. Meese (1997). As the ICE Field Office Director explained during the legal 
proceedings against family detention at Hutto: 
In our IGSAs, our contractual arrangement is with the local government, the entity, 
state, county or local entity that has the facility. The county or whoever we have that 
contractual arrangement with, it’s their choice who operates that facility for them. And 
that's the matter for the county in this case and CCA (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. 
Deposition of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc 
Moore).  
The ICE-CCA-Williamson County triumvirate became particularly complex during and after the 
lawsuit, as the federal court held ICE liable for its noncompliance with Flores, ICE held Williamson 
County liable for completing stipulated changes at Hutto, and Williamson County directed CCA to 
complete those changes:  
More importantly, the IGSA is between the County and ICE, and Williamson County, 
TX is responsible for performance under the terms of the agreement. As background, 
Williamson County was issued a change order under the IGSA on 2/16/2007 to make 
improvements to the facility to bring it more in-line with a non-secure facility required 
for ICE Residential Facilities. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative 
authorized improvements and ICE is in the process of negotiating a final price for these 
changes with CCA. However, any changes to the IGSA should be directed by CCA 
through Williamson County, and then to the ICE Officer, as that's who the agreement 
with ICE is with. (Email from Anthony Gomez, ICE Deputy Assistant Director, Office 
of Acquisition Management, and Removal Operations to Hal Hawes, Assistant to 
Williamson County Attorney, April 5, 2007) 
 
In most cases, CCA then sub-contracted with other private firms for painting, bath fixture 
replacement, fence removal, installing new child-safe doors, social services, and education (Email 
Correspondence from Damon Hininger, CCA on file with author), and ICE outsourced inspections to a 
private firm, as well. This created some confusion, as the functional relationships between ICE, CCA, 
and Williamson County did not cohere with the legal hierarchy of contracted responsibilities. 
Ultimately, Williamson County Commissioners’ Court agreed to delegate authority to CCA, allowing 
ICE and CCA to negotiate Hutto’s changes directly (Email Correspondence between Ashley Lewis, 
ICE Head of Contracting Activity and Gary Mead, Assistant Director of ICE Detention and Removal 
Operations, June 8, 2007). Thus, IGSAs and contracts produce complicated networks of liability, 
monetary circulation, and oversight.  
 
The Obama Administration released Hutto’s families in 2009, filling the empty beds with adult 
women. From 2009 to 2014, ICE returned to its previous policy of issuing Notices to Appear to most 
families, and Berks remained the only family detention facility. In 2013 and 2014 Customs and Border 
Patrol (CBP) and ICE faced an unprecedented increase in arriving unaccompanied children and 
families. In 2013, CBP apprehended 21,553 unaccompanied minors and 7,265 minors and adults 
traveling as families; in 2014, CBP apprehended 49,959 unaccompanied children and 52,326 family 
members, as also discussed by Williams and Massaro (this volume) (US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 2014).  Concerned about reports that people smugglers told children and families that the 
US would not detain them, ICE opened a 672-bed family detention centre in the border patrol training 
facility in Artesia, New Mexico. In addition, ICE implemented a detain-and-deport policy for all 
families held there (Carcamo, 2014; Preston, 2014a) and produced public advertisements about the 
dangers of crossing (Arnold, 2014). Artesia is 200 miles from the nearest city, and the facility was 
closed to visitors for over a month, including human rights representatives and lawyers. Policies on 
communication, legal orientations, and basic child welfare practices changed frequently (Detention 
Watch Network, 2014). ICE closed Artesia in December 2014 after a class action lawsuit charged due 
process violations (Preston, 2014b; M.S.P.C. v. Johnson 2014).  
 
In the meantime, ICE renegotiated existing IGSAs with Karnes County, Texas, and Eloy County, 
Arizona, to open two more family detention centres. Karnes County and ICE have an IGSA for the 
Karnes County Residential Centre that is similar to Williamson County’s, but Karnes County contracts 
with GEO Group, the second largest private prison company in the US after CCA. Opened in 2012 as 
a ‘civil detention centre,’ the facility held adult males until August 2014, when ICE began holding 
families there. The facility was built as a model facility for low risk detainees like asylum-seekers, and 
was touted as a significant step towards a civil model of immigration detention in the United States 
(US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2012). Within months, multiple reports of sexual assault 
emerged from the facility, and lawyers filed a legal complaint (Mexican American Legal and 
Educational Defense Fund, 2014).  
 
Despite CCA’s lacklustre performance at Hutto, ICE worked with CCA to open the South Texas 
Family Residential Facility in Dilley County, Texas, in December, 2014. While it opened with 480 
beds, it has since expanded to 2,400 beds. In what ICE calls a ‘creative response to a difficult 
situation,’ Eloy, Arizona, facilitates the ‘pass-through’ IGSA between ICE and CCA for the facility, 
even though the facility is located in Dilley County (Burnett, 2014). While Eloy houses another CCA 
detention centre, the countyis 931 miles from the South Texas facility, departing from ICE’s usual 
habit of working with counties in which detention centres are housed.  To establish the centre, ICE 
revised its IGSA with Eloy County, rather than establishing a new one with Dilley County 
government. Eloy County passes ICE’s payment of $290 million to CCA, and CCA compensates Eloy 
$438,000 for this service.  In this arrangement, Eloy County officials seek financial gain by expanding 
their existing contract with ICE; for their part, ICE avoids time-consuming negotiations with a new 
county and lengthy competitive bidding requirements for contracting with the private sector. Thus, 
ICE’s executive discretion enabled the creative revision of Eloy County’s IGSA, through which Eloy 
County expanded its financial relationship with CCA. As technologies of government, discretion and 
contracting were made to work in ways that allowed ICE to expand family detention quickly and 
outside of “normal” bidding and negotiations. The service obligations and financial remunerations 
created by these contracts connect federal and county actors and companies in durable networks, 
relationships that allow firms to guarantee shareholders revenue over time.  
 
Given the high involvement of non-state firms in the US detention (and criminal justice) system, 
commodification is integral to the operation of IGSAs, contracts, and ICE’s ability to quickly expand 
and contract detention capacity. Intergovernmental Service Agreements price detention in ‘bed days’ 
(one person per bed per day) and include additional billable services of transportation, guards, and 
detainee work programmes (e.g. ICE’s IGSA with Karnes County). Thus, pricing detention transforms 
policy aims into a priceable commodity, through per diem payment rates per bed or per migrant. These 
contractual relationships circulate money between federal, county, and non-state actors, forming 
networks of people working to reproduce detention.  As Conlon and Hiemstra (2014) show, 
commissaries, communication, and bartering form additional economies within detention centres, so 
that detainees themselves become sources of income for contractors, through ‘bed day’ payments, 
labour, and profit on everyday comfort items. Detention centre ‘privatisation’ produces overlapping 
circuits of exchange and a complex web of consumers, clients, service providers, and governmental 
agencies.  In these economies, the boundaries of public and private do not fit neatly into profit-
oriented and non-profit groups.  Public counties seek monetary gain; detainees are commodities, 
labourers, and traders; and private companies enact disciplinary measures formerly reserved for 
sovereign governments. ICE’s administrative, prosecutorial, and executive discretion and IGSAs’ 
extra-market flexibility allow state and non-state actors to expand and contract migration control 
practices outside of democratic processes and public oversight.   
 
Conclusion 
ICE can and does contract directly with CCA and GEO Group to run other immigration detention 
facilities, and so we must ask what these ICE-county-company arrangements facilitate. What 
strategies, knowledge practices, and legal tactics make family detention possible? What forms of 
authorisation enable it, and how is family detention maintained, rolled back, and expanded once 
again? In July 2015, a federal court judge ruled that any form of family detention violates Flores v. 
Meese and gave ICE until October to comply with her order to release families (Flores v. Johnson 
2014). DHS attorneys appealed the decision, and have applied for childcare facility licenses to bring 
the Dilley and Karnes facilities into compliance with Flores. In October, advocates filed a temporary 
restraining order on the license process, and legal organizations have documented expedited 
deportation for asylum-seeking families in both facilities (Grassroots Leadership v. Texas Department 
of Child and Family Services, 2015; American Immigration Law Association, 2015).  Legal rulings on 
“‘children’s special vulnerability”’ give federal courts more opportunities to intervene in ICE’s 
discretion, contracting, and commodification of family detention than adult detention (see Martin, 
2011), but these rulings can also be used to legitimize and authorize detention practices.  In this 
chapter, I have argued that discretion, contracting, and commodification enabled ICE to implement 
family detention at Berks, expand it to Hutto, roll it back to Berks, expand it to Artesia, and replace 
Artesia with Karnes and Dilley facilities. These three processes are integral to the ‘privatisation’ of 
detention, but understanding them as technologies of government opens up analysis of the active and 
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enthusiastic participation of state agencies in commodifying and contracting out state services. 
Particular legal formulations of ICE’s discretion over immigration enforcement marked out its 
authority to develop, implement, and revise Intergovernmental Service Agreements with, in this 
chapter, county governments. These county governments entered into IGSAs for financial gain in the 
form of tax revenue (from employees) and pass through payments. Eloy and Karnes Counties contract 
detention services out to private corrections firms, and this public-public-private arrangement allows 
all parties to avoid lengthy competitive bidding processes. The IGSAs and contracts themselves detail 
the price ICE will pay for detaining people, with education, transportation, and additional costs for 
families individually detailed separately. This commodification process is not performed solely by for-
profit companies; counties and federal agencies also detail the costs of providing government services 
in order to develop budgets, accounting procedures, and transparency of public spending. Pricing these 
services has become a normal technology of governing.  
 
My goal here has been to destabilise the association between private actors and profit motives, public 
agencies and policy aims.  As private and non-state actors become increasingly active in the everyday 
work of controlling human mobility and closing borders, our theoretical analysis of migration 
control’s socio-technical arrangements is vitally important to our ability to provide meaningful 
critique. Here I want to draw out four important analytical points that follow from conceptualising 
privatised family detention as technologies of government. First, anyone can be an economic actor, 
regardless of their location in the public or private sector. As the examples above demonstrate, county 
government managers seek revenue streams to fund county activities, to provide employment, and to 
provide tax revenue. They value county-owned real estate, liabilities, and budgets, even while they do 
not report to shareholders in the same terms as private corporations.  Following from Spener (2009), 
‘financial gain’ is a more flexible description of the economic logics at work across public and private 
sectors in immigration detention. To fully appreciate how and why detention endures as an 
immigration control—and asylum prevention—strategy, we must be just as attuned to counties’ 
financial incentives to maintain detention as an immigration policy as for-profit firms.  
 The second point is that discretion, contracting, and commodification do political work.  Together, 
they inscribe detention (and imprisonment more broadly) in a marketised regime of value, in which 
value is calculated, exchanged, and circulated according to rules governing commerce, corporations, 
and public-private partnerships. What was once a fundamental sovereign right—the right to deny 
liberty—exercised by state officials has been translated into a service commodity, an amalgam of 
expertise, real estate, and labour. As such, it is not valued as an ethical or disciplinary practice oriented 
towards remaking men’s souls (as analyzed by Foucault, 1995), but in terms of real estate values, 
long-term profitability, and stock prices. Translating detention and imprisonment into a marketised 
regime of value requires certain abstractions (Mitchelson, 2014) and these abstractions depoliticise 
incarceration as a policy practice to many of the actors involved in its daily operations.  
 
The third point is that commodification is a political process, only ever partial and often refused by the 
humans and beings subjected to commodification. For Appadurai (1988, p. 41), commodities are 
‘complex social forms and distributions of knowledge,’ that move in and out of commodification. 
Commodification produces new socio-technical arrangements that translate things into exchange 
values, circulate them, and insert them in a particular regime of value, a discursive regime of shared 
understandings about what things are, what they mean, how they relate to each other, and what they 
say about the person who owns them (see Appadurai, 1988; Callon, 1998). These valuations rely upon 
calculative practices like headcounts, centre capacity quotas, bed day pricing, oversight mechanisms, 
accounting, shareholder annual reports, migration population data, enforcement outcome expectations, 
and so on. Interrogating how these come to be linked up—and the authority that enables them to come 
together in particular forms—allows us to trace a broader range of relationships that enable the 
reproduction of detention as an enforcement strategy.   
 
The fourth point is that ‘privatisation’ processes work to solidify certain boundaries between public 
and private, and these boundaries also work to delimit who may act as political subject, where, and on 
what terms. As Appadurai argues, people disagree about values and rules of exchanging commodities, 
and it is in these tensions between value, exchange, and commodity that ‘politics…links value and 
exchange in the social lives of commodities’ (Appadurai, 1988, p. 57). Likewise, Radin (1996) argues 
that human commodities are only partially commodified because their humanity places a moral limit 
on our willingness to view them solely in terms of money. Moreover, many commodified beings 
exceed the exchange relations in which they are placed; in short, they rebel (Collard, 2014). Detention 
centres are lively, peopled places, and the people detained in them are highly capable of disrupting 
their order, which in turn negates companies’ ability to sell detention centre space. For example, 
prisoners in a US Bureau of Prisons Criminal Alien prison in Willacy, Texas, overtook guards and 
controlled the facility for almost two days in February 2015, destroying the tent-like buildings that 
held them and rendering the facility unusable (Tyx, 2015). Detained mothers launched two hunger 
strikes at Karnes, refusing to work and send their kids to the school (Planas, 2015), and these protests 
were met with threats of separation. These refusals of commodification create their own politics, and 
their own publics, by asserting their right to be and act politically, despite families’ designations as 
undocumented and deportable. And so the boundary between public and private is itself a site of 
struggle. 
 
Focusing on technologies of government allows us to reframe the privatisation of detention in a way 
that points to more diffuse geographies of complicity in imprisonment as a political project. What is 
perhaps exceptional about detention’s commercialisation is that the deprivation of liberty, or the right 
to imprison a private citizen, has long been a privileged—and highly restricted—right of liberal 
sovereign states. Next to the right to take life, the right to deny liberty is a right to a form of physical 
violence and state control that is quite different from state obligations to provide social benefits like 
education, healthcare, unemployment assistance, and housing. In fact, the individual’s relationship to 
the state is mediated by complex legal regimes stipulating the grounds, timing, and conditions in 
which a state may confine a person. Enrolling non-state actors in this kind of state violence, however, 
inscribes detention and incarceration in different regimes of value; processes of marketisation and 
commodification work to revalue the denial of liberty, translating it from an issue of sovereign and 
individual rights to the right to accumulate wealth, the ability of markets to provide efficient services, 
and the responsibility of states to both secure national territory and rule efficiently. We need a 
conceptualisation of privatisation that accommodates a diverse range of financial relationships, actors, 
logics, and calculative practices to ground a critique of detention and incarceration beyond a profit 
motive, to trace the complex geographies of participation in an exclusionary regime of value. 
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